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Abstract. The main changes in the development of identity of Ukrainians after 
the Euromaidan revolution and their influence on internal geopolitics of the state 
are presented in the paper. The authors have made a critical overview of the key 
psychological and symbolic domains of Galician and Little-Russian identity, draw-
ing attention on their changes in the context of the current geopolitical conflict 
which led to the loss of territory in 2014. Throughout all the 20th century and 
nowadays, these identities form the political and cultural landscape of Ukraine 
and generate a number of social divisions. Apart from those identity issues and 
their preconditions, the obstacles for the realisation of the policy of Ukrainian na-
tion-building are also discussed. The authors conclude that there is a tendency to 
strengthen the role of the Ukrainian language and break the ties with Russia in a 
radical way as well as expansion of the pro-Western attitudes and expectations. In 
terms of mentality and civilizational values, the widening gap between millions of 
Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians from the East and the population of 
the central and western regions of Ukraine is also pointed out.
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1. Introduction 
Traditionally, the main research scale of geopoliti-
cal analyses has a global and supranational scope. 
In the second half of the 20th century, the French 
geographers André Siegfried and Yves Lacoste paid 
attention to the importance of regional and local 
dimension of political geography and geopolitics 
which forms a direction known as internal geopol-
itics (la geopolitique interne) of separate states. The 
internal geopolitics is treated as a ‘system of ap-
proaches, whose aim is to balance the political pro-
cesses in all parts of national territory. Its special 
tasks include removing the factors which threaten 
the security and internal stability of the state, as well 
as preventing and resolving territorial conflicts (Dn-
istrianskyy, 2011: 292). Subnational identities have 
an impact on various dimensions of internal geopol-
itics, i.e.: national security, administrative-territori-
al division, principles of self-government, electoral 
and political situation at regional and local level, 
language question, national minority rights, etc.
Providing of balancing and effective internal 
geopolitics is among the key issues especially for 
those Eastern European countries which have no 
commonly accepted national/nationalist program 
because of a number of national, ethnic and reli-
gious groups with ambivalent self-awareness. This 
type of countries is characterized by a potential to 
change the identity of their population as a whole, 
of various social groups and regional communi-
ties. Whithout any doubt, contemporary Ukraine is 
among them. The year 2014 was a turning point 
which began radical transformations in the ap-
proach of the new authorities of Ukraine towards 
the most problematic parts of the internal geopol-
itics, albeit in conditions of significant influence of 
external factors.
At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, in 
Ukrainian, post-Soviet and global scientific litera-
ture there appeared a lot of geopolitical and geo-
cultural concepts about Ukrainian identity, state 
and society: a cleft country (Huntington, 1996), 
‘three Ukraines’ (Il’in, 1998), ‘Ukrainian disunity’ 
(Shulman, 1999), ‘two Ukraines’ (Riabczuk, 2003), 
‘the myth of two Ukraines’, ‘a country of boundaries’, 
‘Ukraine between Russia and the West’, and so on. 
The mentioned concepts underline territorial and 
historical heterogeneity, civilizational and complex 
ethno-linguistic structure of Ukraine. The Euro-
maidan Revolution in 2014 gave a new meaning of 
key terms like ‘Ukrainian nation’, ‘Ukrainian iden-
tity’ and ‘Ukrainian unity’. The maintaining of this 
unity and the occurrence of certain internal con-
flicts as well, depend on the balance of influence of 
the Galician and Little-Russian macro identities on 
the public moods. 
Throughout all the 20th century and nowadays, 
two mentioned identities form the political land-
scape of Ukraine generating visible or hidden so-
cial and territorial divisions. Wherefore, the subject 
matter of our study concerns the basic features of 
the West-Ukrainian (Galician) and Little-Russian 
traditions and their influence on the occurance of 
new lines of internal consolidation and/or opposi-
tion. For that purpose, we have tried to sketch the 
chief differences in the ideological image of Ukraine 
among the main branches of Ukrainian identity, in-
cluding their mutual perception, in the context of 
the changing internal geopolitics after the events of 
2014-2015. What has been applied was a critical ap-
proach taking into account various perspectives of 
interpretation of the Ukrainian identity in politics, 
media, literature and social life. It considers the views 
and attitudes of (pro)Ukrainian opinions and inter-
pretations (Dnistryanskyy, 2008, 2014; Golovchen-
ko, 2015; Gorbenko, K. 2015; Moshovskyy, 2015) as 
well as (pro)Russian ones (Dugin, 2000; Bondaren-
ko, 2014; Dergachev, Nemenskiy, 2014). 
As regards the notion of ‘inheritors of the 
Ukrainian identity’, it is comprehended by the au-
thors as the identity of the population within the 
territory of the Ukrainian state until the beginning 
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of 2014 (including the Crimea, Donetsk and Lu-
gansk regions). 
2. Ethnic, linguistic, and regional dimen-
sions of identity and their impact on 
conflict potential of the Ukrainian so-
ciety 
The internal unity and the traditional conflicts of 
values in the Ukrainian society are determined 
by the dynamics of several factors like the eth-
nic self-identification, the linguistic identity, the 
changeover of language policy, and the political in-
terests of local elites. Their impact on the Ukrainian 
identity has been examined in various studies (Ri-
abczuk, 2000, 2003; Bojcun, 2001; Volovich, Voro-
paeva, 2007; Korostelina, 2013; Krylov, Gritsenko, 
2014; Karmazina, 2015, etc.). Geopolitical transfor-
mation of the Ukrainian identity after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, including the Russian-Ukrainian 
relations, also attracts attention of many scholars 
(Huntington, 1996; Kuzio, 1996; D’Anieri, 1997; 
Shulman, 1998; Riabczuk, 2000; Dugin, 2000; Dn-
istrianskyy, 2014a, b). In the current chapter, the 
above-mentioned questions are analyzed in the con-
text of the ongoing debate on the territorial and po-
litical organization of Ukraine. 
The first factor which shapes regional dispar-
ities in the internal geopolitics of Ukraine is the 
multinational structure of its population. The im-
pact of this factor is so noticeable that ‘аll the 
aspects of the territorial and political identification 
of the Ukrainian society are in this or that way 
related to the ethnocultural self-consciousness of 
the population’ (Dnistrianskyy, Skliarska, 2014: 
190). In contrast to multinational countries exist-
ing nowadays or those that existed in the recent 
past, Ukraine is characterized by a relatively uni-
tary nature of its political structure. The former So-
viet Union (and also today’s Russian Federation), 
the former Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia had a 
more complicated political system and administra-
tive-territorial organization. These historical states 
were politically organized into national federal re-
publics. The same problem concerns the current 
states like China, India, Switzerland, or Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. In fact, before its annexation by the 
Russian Federation, the Autonomous Republic of 
Crimea was the only autonomous territorial unit in 
Ukraine where the Ukrainian language and identi-
ty had the weakest presence. As an ethnic majori-
ty, Russians represent about 75.0% of the citizens of 
Crimea and Sevastopol.
The international perception of this multiethnic 
state most notably includes the clash of the polit-
ical and cultural interests of Russians and Ukrai-
nians, and, in relation to the events in Crimea in 
2014, of the Crimean Tatars. The situation, howev-
er, is more complicated at a regional level. Some 
regions have been under a strong socio-cultural in-
fluence of Hungarians, Belarusians (located in var-
ious regions), Zakarpattia Rusyns (Ruthenians) in 
the Zakarpattia region, Bulgarians (in the Odessa 
and Zaporizhia regions), and Poles (in the Zhyto-
myr, Lviv, and Khmelnytskyi regions). As a whole, 
the chief minority groups are located predomi-
nantly in Western and Southern Ukraine. From the 
point of view of the internal geopolitics of the cen-
tral authorities, the Ukrainian and Russian identi-
ties, which are more flexible in terms of values and 
territorial distribution, bear a geopolitical and civili-
zational messianism capable of attracting the small-
er nations living in Ukraine. Besides the Crimean 
Tatars, a more strongly pronounced emancipation 
with a geopolitical potential is also to be seen in 
other non-Slavic national groups. The Hungarian 
and Romanian minorities, whose number accord-
ing to the 2001 census is respectively 156 thousand 
and 151 thousand people, rely on the active politi-
cal support of the Hungarian and Romanian states.
The most enduring psychological differences 
are caused by the historical belonging of certain 
Ukrainian regions to state entities of various social 
structures and cultural identities. On the one hand, 
certain objective historical differences are politically 
instrumentalized by the pro-Russian separatists who 
believe in the idea of a Russian World. Their geopo-
litical aims are directed to federalization or separa-
tion of the pro-Russian regions from Ukraine. On 
the other hand, in certain cases, the same applies to 
the patriots/nationalists, who insist on the Europe-
anness of Ukraine and on the cultural incompati-
bility between the Russian and Ukrainian societies. 
In reality, the differences in question are not so sig-
nificant so as to speak of a total incompatibility of 
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the population’s values as was the case of the for-
mer Yugoslavia which was far more heterogeneous 
in religious, cultural, historical, administrative, and 
political terms. 
In contrast to a number of other multination-
al states, Ukraine is characterized by national and 
religious groups with relatively close ethnocultur-
al and civilizational features. The main pillars of 
populations’ identity are: the Slavic ethno-linguistic 
element (Ukrainians, Russians, Ruthenians, Belar-
usians, Bulgarians, Poles), the Christian/Orthodox 
religion (with a significant presence of Greek Cath-
olics in the Western regions), the use of a common 
(Cyrillic) alphabet. The lack of dialogue and of an 
elaborate democratic model for consensus and rec-
onciliation are the factors which give the impression 
of a deep geopolitical and civilizational rift among 
the Ukrainian citizens. Some are of the opinion 
(Moshovskyy, 2015: 45) that the conflict in Donbass 
is not purely geopolitical in nature, but a ‘deeper – 
cultural, visional, metaphysical conflict between two 
Russian Christian civilizations’. This conflict of val-
ues of different groups of the Ukrainian population, 
however, has its clearly defined geopolitical projec-
tions. The history after Yanukovych’s presidency has 
many remarkable examples in this regard. The par-
ticipants in the revolution on the Maidansquare in 
Kiev waved not only the Ukrainian flag, but also 
the flag of the EU to demonstrate their civilization-
al and geopolitical choice. In contrast, the Russian 
flag was a part of the counter-revolutionary regional 
protests and the subsequent public activity of their 
opponents who favour integration in the Eurasian 
structures. 
 The terms Western and Eastern Ukraine, 
which are the key to the geopolitical analyses, are 
meta-geographical units. The boundaries of these 
internal spatial spheres are blurred. Their arbitrary 
character can be seen in the Dnystrianskyy’s car-
tographic model (2008). Taking into consideration 
signs like the maturity of the ethnic self-identifica-
tion, the dominance of the Russian or Ukrainian 
language, and the electoral preferences of the popu-
lation, this author divides Ukraine into four types of 
territories. They do not coincide with the tradition-
al macroregions (Fig. 1). This map shows the weak-
ening of the spatial concentration of the Ukrainian 
cultural element (language, and ethnic self-iden-
tification) from west to east and from north to 
south-southeast. The strong presence of Ukrainian-
ness is to be found mainly in the zones of types I, II, 
and III. Zone IV includes ‘territories with an acute 
crisis of the Ukrainian identity’ which include the 
seceded Autonomous Republic of Crimea, as well 
as parts of the ‘separatist’ Donetsk and Lugansk re-
gions.
A number of other lines of discordance in iden-
tity determinants, for instance, language, religion, 
historical awareness, and historical policy, are lay-
ered over the two main axes of opposition: West 
– East, and Ukrainians – Russians. As Ryabchuk 
aptly notes, one-third of the population have a clear 
national consciousness and unequivocally iden-
tify themselves with the Ukrainian political na-
tion. The remaining two-thirds of Ukrainians are 
neither Russians, nor Ukrainians, but rather ‘lo-
cal’ people who have a pre-national stage of con-
sciousness. Potentially they could be both Russians 
and Ukrainians and even citizens of Kievan Rus, 
or, could create some Donbass, Kherson or Kriv-
orozh nation (Riabczuk, 2000). The results of the 
Kiev International Institute of Sociology’s survey 
conducted in 2004 showed that citizens with dual 
(Ukrainian-Russian) self-identification represent 
11.0% of the population of the western regions 
of Ukraine. In the southern and eastern regions, 
Fig. 1. Regional differences in the cultural and linguistic 
structure of the population of Ukraine
Explanation: I – areas (regions) with a relatively homoge-
nous Ukrainian cultural environment; II – areas where the 
Ukrainian language dominates in villages and small towns 
and the Ukrainian population in the large cities is partially 
assimilated; III – areas with impaired ethnocultural ties be-
tween the largely assimilated population of the large cities 
and the partially assimilated population of the villages; IV – 
areas with an acute crisis of the Ukrainian identity
Source: Dnistrianskyy, M. 2008
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the people with dual self-identification represent-
ed 41.0%. It is typical that the Russian speaking 
Ukrainians have a post-Soviet identity; they con-
sider ‘Slav’ or ‘CIS resident’ as the most important 
identifiers (Volovich, Voropaeva, 2007).
Declaring a ‘Ukrainian’ nationality at the popu-
lation censuses does not necessarily mean that ev-
ery person who declared it is loyal to the Ukrainian 
project. On the other hand, not everyone who de-
fines himself or herself as a Russian-speaking 
Ukrainian in cultural and linguistic terms, shows 
solidarity with the policy of the Russian Federation, 
considering their own identification as a citizen of 
the Ukrainian state to be more important.
In Ukraine, the language is considered to be a 
‘strategic key’, a ‘guarantee of national self-aware-
ness and historical memory’ (Kresina, Gorbaten-
ko, 2008). Further to the frequent changes of the 
central government’s policy, the Ukrainian territory 
went through different phases of Russification and 
Ukrainization throughout the entire 20th century, 
accompanied by conflicts which left many traumas 
in the minds of certain groups of people.
According to a number of indicators, the Russian 
language has kept its strong positions in the social, 
cultural and educational fields throughout the entire 
post-Soviet period. For example, the Russian-speak-
ing Ukrainians represent 15.0% of the population. 
According to data for the mid 2000s, Russian is the 
preferred language at work, in public places and in 
school (Table 1). Another proof of the complicated 
and unique linguistic situation in Ukraine is the rel-
atively high share (between 15.6% and 17.2%) of cit-
izens using a mix of Russian and Ukrainian words 
(the so-called Surzhyk). 
The data of sociological survey from 2016 con-
ducted by the Ukrainian ogranisation Space of Free-
dom on the territory controlled by the government 
of Kiev prove that the Ukrainian language is de-
clared as the mother tongue by 60.0% of the popu-
lation, whereas the Russian language by 15.0%. On 
the other hand, in everyday life the linguistic situ-
ation is much more complicated. For instance, the 
percentage of people who speak Ukrainian at home 
(49.0%) is lower in comparison with the people 
who declare this language as their mother tongue. 
A slightly smaller number of people communicate 
in Ukrainian at work or in school (46.0%). In family 
environment, 24.0% of Ukrainians speak the Russian 
language. At the regional level, Ukrainian is a moth-
er tongue for 93.0% of residents of Western Ukraine 
and for 78.0% of residents of Central Ukraine. On 
the contrary, the Ukrainian is least spoken in the 
South (35.0%) and in Donbass (20.0%). As the sur-
vey showed, an indicator that proves the complexi-
ty of the language issue is the share of respondents 
who consider their language both as Ukrainian to 
the same extent as Russian. In 2016 it was 22.0%.
Despite all the measures against broadcasting of 
the Russian language TV channels and programs, 
Language use
Language used 
for 
communication
in the family
Language used 
in everyday life
Language used 
at work, in shops 
and 
public places
Language used 
for communication at 
work and school
Exclusive use of Ukrainian 34.0 29.3 24.1 22.3
Prevailing use of Ukrainian, 
rarely Russian 8.4 8,6 11.7 12.1
Mixed use of both Ukrainian 
and Russian words 17.3 15.7 17.8 17.1
Prevailing use of Russian, 
rarely Ukrainian 9.7 10.7 15.6 17.1
Exclusive use of Russian 29.5 35.0 30.7 30.2
Source: Movna situatsia v Ukraini: mizh konfliktom i konsensusom, 2008
Table 1. The use of the Ukrainian and Russian languages in Ukraine 
(based on data from the annual  monitoring of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences)
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there is ‘information-psychological dependency’ 
(Dnistriansky, 2008) of the population on Russian 
cultural TV productions. In print media, however, 
the share of the Russian language editions prevails. 
In 2005, 31.3% of the circulation of all newspa-
pers are in the Ukrainian language (as opposed to 
64.0% in Russian) (Movna situatsia v Ukraini: mizh 
konfliktom i konsensusom, 2008). Taking into ac-
count only the territories under Ukrainian control, 
in 2015 the situation did not change much. The 
percentage of books and brochures published in 
Ukrainian was 65.2%, while in Russian 30.4%. The 
Russian language (the language of a national mi-
nority) has maintained its dominant position in the 
total circulation of printed newspapers (61.5%), ex-
ceeding almost twice the newspapers in Ukrainian 
(34.0%) (Stanovishhte ukrains’koyi movi v Ukraini 
u 2016 roci, 2016).
The political disputes over the status of the Rus-
sian language played an important psychological 
role in the past and will undoubtedly have a direct 
impact on the future relationship between the cen-
tral government and the Russian speaking Ukrai-
nians. Victor Yanukovych came to power in 2010, 
promising to give the Russian language a status of 
the second state language in Ukraine. During his 
presidency, however, the Russian language was giv-
en the status of a regional language only. Imme-
diately after Yanukovych’s dismissal, this status was 
repealed by the government. It was a purely politi-
cal decision and is considered to be one of the big-
gest mistakes of the new government which lead to 
an increasing discontent of the East. President Po-
roshenko’s policy leaves no doubt as to what the in-
tentions of the central authorities are in regard to 
the language issue: ‘Ukrainian has been and will re-
main the only state language’, as stated by the provi-
sion of Art. 10 of the Constitution of 1996. 
This conception based on the idea of Ukrainiza-
tion was applied to the new education law accept-
ed at the beggining of September 2017. According 
to the new law, the process of teaching in the lan-
guage of national minorities became limited just 
to the level of initial classes. Later, however, the 
teaching must be conducted only in Ukrainian. 
In 2015/2016, in the districts of the western and 
central part of the country above 99.0% of pupils 
received their education in Ukrainian. However, 
in the Odessa region  (69.0%), the Lugansk re-
gion  (65.0%) and the Donetsk region  (58.0%), the 
largest number of pupils was educated in Russian 
(www.slovoidilo.ua/2017/09/26/infografika/polity-
ka/skilky-ditej-ukrayini-navchayutsya-movamy-na-
czionalnyx-menshyn).
The new law condition would fundamentally 
change the situation of national minorities, which 
are now deprived of the right to receive education 
in their mother languages. The reason of mentioned 
legal changes is the target of authorities to elimi-
nate the Russian language from schools and public 
life. It refers to 614 schools where the Russian lan-
guage is taught (according to the data for the year 
2015/2016). At the same time, the new legal regu-
lations directly threaten the education in a moth-
er tongue in 75 Romanian, 69 Hungarian, 5 Polish 
and 3 Moldavian schools as well as 594 education-
al units where education takes place in several lan-
guages. Thus, there are conditions creating future 
conflicts not only between central authorities but 
national minorities as well.
In conclusion, it shall be noted that during the 
post-Soviet period, the most significant obstacles 
in the way of modernization and internal consol-
idation of the fragile Ukrainian state were the fol-
lowing: the persisting economic crisis, the cyclical 
political coups (also including the ‘Orange Revolu-
tion’), the competition between regional socio-eco-
nomic clans, and the clash of divergent interests of 
external geopolitical centres of power (Russia, the 
EU, the USA, and Turkey). Taking into consider-
ation all obstacles, which to a large extent still ex-
ist, even in more acute forms, some geopolitical 
analysts predicted a possible separation of parts of 
Ukraine or its dividing between the neighbouring 
states. These scenarios could not have been partial-
ly fulfilled (like the loss of Crimea) if a harmonized 
policy, based on dialogue and balanced internal 
geopolitics, was provided, and if the interests of the 
major foreign policy partners of Ukraine were tak-
en into consideration. But why was this model not 
meant to be? It is impossible to give an unequivo-
cal answer to this question. It is a part of numerous 
discussions on the modern Ukrainian ethnocultural 
and ethnopolitical identity. A few basic macro ap-
proaches to the definition of its essence dominate. 
They could be divided in pan-Ukrainian/strictly 
Ukrainian, pro-Russian/Little Russian, East-Slavic 
and all-Ukrainian ones.
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3. Self-identification and administrative- 
territorial organization
The specifics of the historic past, the ethnic di-
versity as well as the various political and economic 
interests are in the basis of the requests for a greater 
autonomy of particular regions or federalization of 
Ukraine (1). The striving for autonomy depends on 
a certain historical and geopolitical context and fol-
lows the changes of the political and psychological 
atmosphere in the society. In this regard, Dergachev 
(2007) concludes that Ukraine’s local patriotism is 
not based on the principles of the European region-
alism, but rather on the territorial separatism. In the 
end, the nationalist model of the unitary regional-
ism is replaced by ‘oligarchic regionalism’ which is 
also devoid of the principles of the EU’s policy.
As Wolczuk (2002) points out, between 1989 and 
1994, the ideas of federalism were popular among 
the non-communist elite in three regions of Galicia, 
who won the local elections. Near the end of the 
existence of the Soviet Union, this was the desired 
form of decentralization of the country. The then 
Chairman of the Lviv region saw the ideas of the 
autonomy of Galicia as an opportunity to counter 
the central communist government in Kiev in 1990-
1991. After Ukraine declared its independence, 
there comes a period when the West Ukrainian 
elites change their opinions and oppose projects for 
strong decentralization. In the next years, the con-
cept of local autonomy gains ground among the Ro-
manian and Hungarian minorities, as well as among 
the representatives of the mainly Russian-speak-
ing southeast. After the Orange Revolution which 
brought Viktor Yushchenko to power, the national-
ist policy pursued by the central government meets 
the awakening of the regional nationalism in the 
eastern and southern parts of Ukraine. The initia-
tive of the local administrative leaders from the 
eastern regions led to the emergence of a concep-
tion of Southeast Autonomous Ukrainian Republic 
encompassing the following territories: the Lugansk, 
Donetsk, Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkov, Zaporozhye, 
Kherson, Nikolaev, and Odessa regions as well as 
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. After Yanu-
kovych’s dismissal, similar initiatives were proposed 
in the Ukrainian parliament by deputies from the 
Party of Regions. Radical measures in this direc-
tion was also taken in the spring of 2014 with the 
self-proclamation of the Lugansk and Donetsk re-
gions as “independent republics”. 
Post-revolutionary central authorities make ev-
ery effort to counteract the ideas of restructuring 
of Ukraine on a federal or confederal basis. A sim-
ilar scenario for Donbass is strongly rejected by 
nationalists and is accompanied by accusations of 
collaboration with the ‘Donbass separatists’ and the 
‘Russian occupiers’. A certain pressure has been ex-
erted within the so-called ‘Norman Four’ group on 
the Ukrainian government in order to achieve a 
deeper political and administrative decentralization. 
In this format of negotiations, France, Germany and 
Russia are the main mediators between Ukraine and 
the Lugansk and Donetsk separatists. As a result of 
the so-called Minsk II agreements of February 12, 
2015, a ceasefire was reached, meaning that the in-
tensity of the fighting on the front lines in the two 
southeastern regions was reduced. Point 11 of these 
agreements concerned future constitutional reforms 
and the introduction of a new constitution by the 
end of 2015, stipulating decentralization and the 
adoption of a special status of certain parts of the 
Donetsk and Lugansk regions, including the right to 
determine their language. A possible implementa-
tion of this plan would mean that the two pro-Rus-
sian regions will continue to play a significant role 
in the political and economic life of Ukraine, also 
with their electoral weight and influence over the 
determining of Kiev’s foreign policy priorities. The 
fears of the political elite have been shown in var-
ious academic studies over the years. For instance, 
according to the Ukrainian geographer Dnistrian-
skyy (2014: 176), from a functional point of view, 
some federal states represent a specific compromise 
in the historical process. Some of them, however, 
like Canada, Belgium, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
are characterized by instability and the reason be-
hind this is that there has always been a threat for 
the federalist ideas to grow into the separatist ones. 
The identification of those two options lead to the 
fears of the federalization of Ukraine, which is con-
sidered to be an unacceptable and dangerous form 
of decentralization. 
The political leaders of the eastern regions, 
where the Russian and post-Soviet identity domi-
nates, conduct a completely opposite policy. After 
the Euromaidan revolution, the so-called Lugansk 
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and Donetsk People’s Republics were proclaimed. 
They were created by local pro-Russian forces that 
refer to the principle of self-determination and pres-
ervation of political, administrative, and linguistic 
autonomy. The two republics merged on May 24, 
2014 to form the Confederation of Novorossiya, 
which dissolved itself in May 2015. The revolution-
ary forces in Kiev were criticized mainly for orga-
nizing an anti-constitutional armed coup and also 
for the fact that the new government ignored their 
demands and interests. It should be noted that the 
local military forces and the police also crossed a 
number of regions and cities of the separated terri-
tories on the side of the self-proclaimed republics. 
At the same time, the republics, morally and po-
litically supported by Russia, were declared terror-
ist organizations by the Ukrainian government who 
considered Donbass and Crimea to be temporary 
occupied territories.
According to available data, in the mid-2015, 
about one-third of the territory of the Donetsk and 
Lugansk regions are under control of the pro-Rus-
sian separatists (Table 2). As regards the population 
under their control, our calculations show that its 
share is 54.0% of the population of the Donetsk re-
gion and 67.0% of the population of the Lugansk 
region. Together with the territory of the Auton-
omous Republic of Crimea, over 6 million people 
Territorial Unit Territory,km2
Share of
the territory
of Ukraine,
%
Share of
the relevant
territory
under control 
of
Russia/
DNR*/
LNR **,
%
Population,
2014,
Ukraine’s
population
%
Share of
the population
under control of
Russia/
DNR*/
LNR **,
%
The Republic of
Crimea and Sevastopol 26 964 4.5 100 2 353 129 5.2 100
the Republic of
Crimea 26 100 4.3 100 1 967 259 4.3 100
the city of
Sevastopol 640 1.4 100 385 870 0.8 100
The Donetsk region  25 592 4.2 33.4 4 343 882 9.6 54.0
DNR 8 538 1.4 100 2 332 556 5.1 100
The Lugansk Region 26 684 4.4 31.3 2 239 473 4.9 67.0
LNR 8 352 1.4 100 1506549 3.3 100
Ukraine 603 628 - - 45 226 249 - -
Territory/ population
out of control of the
Ukrainian 
government
43 854 7.3 100 6 192 234 13.4 100
Table 2. Territory and population out of control of the Ukrainian authorities, 2014
Explanation: *DNR – the Donetsk People’s Republic; **LNR – the Lugansk People’s   Republic.
Source: Elaborated by the authors on the basis of: http://pop-stat.mashke.org/ukraine-division.htm (Accessed on: 10.02.2016); 
http://glavstat.govdnr.ru/ (Accessed on: 11.02.2016)
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are beyond Ukraine’s control. What makes the ap-
propriate illustration of the economic relevance of 
these territories is the fact that the so-called DPR 
and LPR are composed of about 14.0% of the in-
dustrial production of  Ukraine (Slyvka, Zakutyns-
ka, 2016: 100).
The moods of Ukrainians regarding the status 
and policy of the state of the rebellious regions are 
the subject of a number of sociological studies. For 
instance, between 19 and 30 November 2015, the 
Rating Group Ukraine conducted a national opin-
ion poll, excluding territories without control of the 
central government. According to 75.0% of the re-
spondents, the Donetsk and Lugansk regions should 
remain within Ukraine: with the same status as be-
fore the war (32.0%), with extended responsibilities 
as a result of decentralization reform (35.0%), or as 
an autonomous region (8.0%) (IRI’s Center for In-
sights Poll…).
Another sociological survey, conducted by the 
Centre for East European and International Studies 
(Berlin), also shows social attitudes towards the sta-
tus of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions not only 
on the areas controlled by Kiev. While in these ter-
ritories 65.0% of respondents pleaded for return of 
the so-called DNR and LNR in the Donetsk and 
the Lugansk regions, the moods in the areas con-
trolled by pro-Russian forces are opposite. 33.0% of 
them opt for joining their territories to Russia in 
the form of special autonomy, whereas 35.0% see a 
solution to the political problem of the status of au-
tonomy within the Ukrainian state (Doslidzhennya: 
na rozdilenomu Donbasi naselennya maye shozhi 
nastroyi).
4. The pan-Ukrainian identity model. 
From regional separatism to 
statebuilding power
The pan-Ukrainian identity model is also called 
strictly Ukrainian or a Ukrainian-nationalist mod-
el. It has different versions. One of them considers 
the regional Western Ukrainian or Galician identi-
ty as the core of the model. The affirmation of that 
identity took place in the  19th century in the rela-
tively more liberal Austro-Hungarian Empire. The 
Western-Ukrainian identity is typical for the pop-
ulation of today’s Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, 
Volyn and Rivne regions. Traditionally, they have 
close cultural ties with Poland and Central Europe. 
Their cultural profile, historical sensitivity, civili-
zational and political orientation towards external 
powers differ from the traditional ‘Little Russian/
South-Russian’ identity which is also part of the 
Ukrainian nation-building process. During the pe-
riod of Soviet Ukraine, in the years after the Second 
World War, the ideology of Western Ukrainians de-
veloped in the form of specific regional separatism. 
It got stronger through the years, expanding its in-
fluence to the central, southern and eastern parts 
of Ukraine. This is also valid for the Ukrainian lan-
guage which has no traditions in the mentioned re-
gions.
West-Ukrainianness is mainly associated with 
the social and political values historically shaped 
in Galicia. That is why the Ukrainian nationalism 
is called ‘Galician’. According to Dnistrianskyy and 
Skliarska (2014: 197), the high degree of involvement 
in the all-Ukrainian historical process and quite an 
integral ethnic cultural environment enables the 
Volin and Galicia areas to become the leaders in 
the consolidation of both the Ukrainian national 
state and the political nation. The population of the 
Eastern regions, in turn, see the policy of the Gali-
cian group as a desire to impose the Ukrainian lan-
guage, their version of the Ukrainian history, their 
symbols and national heroes, myths and rituals, on 
the rest of the ethnic and regional communities of 
the population. According to Nemenskiy (2014), the 
promotion of the image of the Galician citizen as 
a true Ukrainian convinces people from other re-
gions that they are not true Ukrainians. It is difficult 
to question this as the Galician citizens themselves 
are Ukrainian speaking. It is not a coincidence that 
about two-thirds of the people killed in the most 
tragic days of the protests (February 18-21, 2014) 
were citizens of the western Ukrainian regions (i.e., 
Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Volyn and Rivne, 
Vinnytsia, Ternopil, and Zhytomyr).
The traditional geopolitical consciousness of the 
Galician nationalism is rich in both anti-Russian 
and anti-Polish views. The nationalist interpretation 
regards not only the Moscovians but also neigh-
bouring countries like Poland, Romania, and Hun-
gary as occupiers of the ‘Ukrainian ethnic lands’ at 
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one period of history or another. The Moscovians 
have always been, and they still are, the main ene-
my in the value system of the Ukrainian geopolitical 
consciousness, influenced by this model of interpre-
tation. They are perceived as the main factor block-
ing the processes of building the Ukrainian nation, 
of the full development of the Ukrainian state, lan-
guage, and culture. The image of Russians is based 
on the perception of an alien nation, described by 
some highly subjective interpretations as a nation 
with non-Slavic origin (Ugro-Finnic, Tatar-Mongo-
lian), attached to a collective life, to the authoritar-
ian models of political organization, to leaderism, 
and to the lack of traditions of a civil society.
The ideologists of the Ukrainian independence 
defend a model of historical development combining 
both the experience of the western regions, which 
were parts of Rzeczpospolita and Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, and the history of Cossack territorial-politi-
cal formations between 16th and 18th centuries in the 
central and eastern parts of today’s Ukraine, regard-
ed as a Ukrainian proto-state. These two different 
traditions have influenced the formation of a more 
freedom-loving spirit and non-centralized models of 
political organization and social relations. The result 
of the geopolitical and geocultural presence of the 
Western-Christian civilization is the heritage of the 
Greek Catholic Church, which was founded in the 
middle of 17th century through the organizational 
inclusion of a part of the Eastern-Slavic population 
to the Roman Catholic Church. Throughout the en-
tire 20th century and in relation to the events around 
the Orange and Euromaidan Revolutions, the heri-
tage of the Greek Catholic Church remains a strong 
factor for occidentalization of the Ukrainian society. 
A number of social phenomena, however, suggest 
the preservation of typical post-Soviet features of 
the post-communist transition, typical also of Rus-
sia. Ukraine is still distinguished by an oligarchic 
economic model, a deep social differentiation of the 
society characterized by a low number of multi-mil-
lionaires controlling a vast share of the regional and 
national economy, weak middle class and a signif-
icant share of the population living below the pov-
erty line, massive corruption, etc.      
In the socio-political sphere, the far nationalist 
trend of interpreting the essence of the Ukrainian-
ness is monopolized by organizations such as the 
‘Right Sector’ (2), and some parties which are pre-
sented in the parliament, i.e. the Svoboda (Free-
dom) party of Oleh Tyahnibok and the Radical 
Party of Oleg Lyashko. Both the moderate pro-
Ukrainian forces and the far nationalists had a com-
mon platform for more than a year. They shared 
the same view on the internal geopolitics and still 
have common grounds like the fight against Yanu-
kovych, rooting out his economic and political her-
itage, the decommunization of the political life and 
public space (including the destruction of some 
monuments dating back to the Soviet era). The 
Ukrainian identity in its anti-Russian/anti-Soviet 
form is also reflected in the four laws for decommu-
nization which entered into force in May 2015. The 
controversial law condemning the communist and 
Nazi totalitarian regimes in Ukraine and prohibiting 
the propaganda of their symbols forbids all Sovi-
et symbols; the members of the Ukrainian Insur-
gent Army were declared heroes and fighters for the 
Ukrainian independence. This law treats both com-
munism and Nazism as equivalent regimes. Its im-
plementation revises the symbols of the communist 
era which has been a part of the cultural landscape 
of thousands of Ukrainian cities, villages, adminis-
trative districts, and regions for decades. According 
to a list from the Ukrainian Institute of National 
Remembrance, more than 500 names of commu-
nist activists need to be eliminated from the public 
life in Ukraine. Apart from renaming streets bearing 
the names of communist activists, this measure also 
results in changing the names of some 1,000 cities. 
Cities like Dzerzhynsk, Ilichovsk (Chornomorsk), 
Artemivsk (Bakhmut), Krasnyi Lyman (Lyman) 
were renamed as part of this campaign by the end 
of 2015. The same fate awaits Dnipropetrovsk, 
Dniprodzerzhynsk, Kirovohrad, Komsomolsk, Dim-
itrov, Ulyanovka, and others. 
The Euro-Atlantic vector of the Ukraine’s geo-
political consciousness is tightly connected with the 
evolution of the Galician interpretation of the his-
tory of the Ukrainian culture and statehood. The 
historical forming of the Ukrainian ethnicity is pre-
sented as a result of the favourable civilizational in-
fluence of Poland, the Catholic world and Latin 
Europe on the Eastern Slavs from the western parts 
of the territory of today’s Ukraine. Тhe pro-Euro-
pean policy of the current Ukrainian government 
is stimulated to a large extent by Poland. Namely, 
the Polish diplomacy was one of the key initiators 
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of the European Neighbourhood Policy program, 
where Ukraine is one of the largest beneficiaries. 
On a global scale, the EU and the USA are 
the main directions of the desired integration of 
Ukraine. In psychological and moral terms, the 
image of the EU is attached to the European val-
ues, with an integration vector which is the source 
of political and social ideas for the modernization 
of the Ukrainian society. Another aspect is the ex-
pected help from the European Union in the lo-
cal governance and regional politics, which could 
support the policy of transition from regional-oli-
garchic to the democratic, pluralistic, and self-gov-
erning model of development of the regions and 
their relations with Kiev. After 8 years of negoti-
ations, on January 1, 2016, a free trade agreement 
between Ukraine and the EU entered into force. 
However, the perspectives of a EU membership of 
the country remain unclear and without any guar-
antees. The process was accompanied by a cancel-
lation of the free trade and the suspension of air 
communication with Russia. 
The implementation of the pro-Western course 
allows for a potential membership in the EU, com-
bined with the continuation of the policy of re-
ducing the energetic and economic dependence on 
Russia. The increasing sympathy towards NATO 
among the traditionally moderate politicians is an 
indicator of changes in the geopolitical conscious-
ness of the Ukrainian elite. A current example is 
the evolution of the political views and activities of 
Leonid Kravchuk, the first President of indepen-
dent Ukraine. He was among the active opponents 
of NATO, leading an anti-NATO ‘educational cam-
paign’ in 2012. Nevertheless, he completely changed 
his position in the new geostrategic situation in 
April 2014, saying that ‘the only possible protec-
tion from Russia’s aggression is to join NATO’ (see 
Karmazina, 2015: 160).
The ‘Finlandization’ of Ukraine is also possible. 
This option means only a EU membership, with-
out accession to NATO. In the current geopolitical 
situation, such a scenario is inconceivable for the 
pro-Western post-revolutionary government, but it 
fits the psychological and political expectations of 
the pro-Russian citizens concentrated mainly in the 
eastern regions. 
5. The Little Russian/Pro-Russian/Post-So-
viet identity. Different names, com-
mon values
This subnational identity opposes the 
pan-Ukrainian idea which, in the opinion of the 
pro-Russian Ukrainian geopolitician Vladimir Der-
gachev, is an ‘ideology of the Ukrainian fundamen-
talism whose aim is to ‘conquer’ the living space of 
Ukraine by ‘the true Ukrainians’, so that they im-
pose one all-Ukrainian way of thinking on all the 
citizens, regardless of their nationality’.
In the spirit of the old imperial traditions of Rus-
sia, Ukraine and Ukrainians are respectively called 
Little Russia and Little Russians. They are consid-
ered to be an integral part of the great Russian eth-
nicity. Another evidence of this is the fact that in 
2014 deputies of the nationalist Liberal Democratic 
Party of Russia suggested renaming Ukraine to Lit-
tle Russia. From the point of view of the national 
identity and psychology of Ukrainians, the contro-
versial ethnonym is unacceptable as there is a frac-
tion of national contempt enshrined in it, implying 
ethnocultural secondness, a subordinate political 
status and even historical inferiority. Concerning 
the origin of the term Little Russia, it first appears 
at the end of the 14th century in Byzantium in or-
der to designate the Galicia-Volhynia and the Kiev 
kingdoms for the purposes of the territorial organi-
zation of the Orthodox Church. Little Russia is also 
a term used for expressing the self-identification of 
a number of intellectuals of the 19th century who 
are nowadays included in the list of heroes of the 
Ukrainian nationalism. 
From the point of view of the Little Russians, the 
establishment of specific Ukrainian consciousness, 
language and literature are usually seen as artificial 
phenomena resulting from ‘a negative impact’ of the 
Polish-Lithuanian state and Austro-Hungary on the 
western and southern parts of the former Kievan 
Rus. The most radical supporters of this approach 
are convinced that the ‘Ukrainians are westernised 
Russians’ and Ukraine is an ‘imaginary’ and ‘artifi-
cial’ country with the non-coherent regions united 
in a new republic (and later on independent coun-
try) thanks to achievements of the Soviet geopoli-
tics. For instance, the radical Russian geopolitician 
Dugin used a similar approach. He claims that exis-
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tence of a state like Ukraine does not have any geo-
political sense in the Eurasian space. It owns neither 
the characteristics of a culture with universal sig-
nificance, nor geographic uniqueness or ethnic ex-
clusivity (Dugin, 2000: 216). According to him, the 
existence of a unitary Ukraine is unacceptable and 
he predicts its division into 4 geopolitical entities, 
namely Western, Eastern, Central Ukraine, and 
Crimea.
The conservative Russian geopolitical conscious-
ness regards Ukrainians, Russians and Belarusians 
as elements of the “indivisible” Eastern-Slavic na-
tion, united by the heritage of the Kievan Rus, the 
Cyrillic alphabet and the Orthodox Church. The 
same models of perception of Ukraine, of its politi-
cal and ethnic Ukrainianness, were carried over and 
adapted in the Russian World doctrine emerged at 
the beginning of the 21st century. During the cur-
rent  Ukrainian crisis, the use of the terms a Lit-
tle Russian and a New Russian identity intensifies 
in the Russian information space. We must keep in 
mind that the Little Russians are Russian-speaking 
Ukrainians do not deny the right of Ukraine to ex-
ist as a multicultural and bilingual state. 
The New Russian identity is a branch of the Lit-
tle Russian one whose outlines appeared after Left-
bank Ukraine joining Russia at the end of the 17th 
century. In essence, it is a Russian identity, a region-
al variation, which unites the people with Russian 
ethnic consciousness. These are fellow countrymen 
living in a diaspora. The Russian historian Nemen-
skiy (2014) clarifies that the New Russian identity 
is still to emerge in geopolitics, and that there are 
only initial attempts in order to construct it. The 
two projects – both of the New Russian and the 
Little Russian identity – have a common ground in 
the South-Russian consciousness and culture, his-
torically formed on the territory of today’s Ukraine. 
One of the local variations of the Little Russian/
New Russian ideological tradition is the Donbass 
identity. It is based on social codes as follows: the 
industrialization, the remembrance of the victory 
over fascism in the Great Patriotic War, the Rus-
sian language, the nostalgic feeling for the Soviet 
era, the proximity to Russia, the electoral support 
for the Party of Regions and the Communist Par-
ty. Yanukovych’s dismissal is perceived as an armed 
coup inspired and financed by the West. At the end 
of 2013 and in 2014, the Donbass identity was in a 
primary phase of passivity awaiting of the outcome 
of events of the Euromaidan. Afterwards, the polit-
ical appeals for listening to the voice of the East in-
tensified and led to an armed conflict proclaiming 
of two ‘independent’ republics. 
The protests against Yanukovych were accompa-
nied by slogans such as ‘Listen to the voice of Don-
bass’, ‘We worked while they stayed on the Maidan 
square’. Later on, during the protests of the co-called 
Russian spring there appeared slogans like ‘Russia, 
come’, ‘Putin, bring army’, ‘referendum’ (Gorbenko, 
2015:137). According to the Russian political scien-
tist Bondarenko (2014), the Russian spring can be 
regarded as ‘an awakening of a political nation and 
a revival of the conservative values’. The pro-Russian 
opponents of the Revolution were stigmatized as 
second category people, orchestrated by the Krem-
lin propaganda, without active civic engagement 
and their own social position.
Millions of citizens from the Ukrainian east and 
south support the integration course of the coun-
try, which takes into consideration its East-Slavic 
and Orthodox supranational identity. These peo-
ple regard themselves as a part of the historic Little 
Russian project. This suggests priority participa-
tion in the integration structures developed in the 
post-Russian space of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakh-
stan (e.g., the Eurasian Economic Union, the Eur-
asian Customs Union, etc.). This option remains 
acceptable for the larger part of the ethnic Russians 
and a part of the Russian-speaking Ukrainians, es-
pecially those who are middle-aged and old gener-
ations. Their sentiment towards Russia and Belarus 
and the Soviet symbols expressed in the sociological 
surveys throughout the entire period of transforma-
tion, show an evidence for the preservation of the 
Soviet mentality. They deny the right of the West-
ern Ukrainians to consider themselves a benchmark 
of Ukrainianness and their claims to be the only in-
heritors of medieval Rus, emphasizing on the ‘be-
trayal’ of the Orthodox religion, the breaking up of 
the unity and authentic identity of the East-Slav-
ic Orthodox people. Regarding the sphere of econ-
omy and security, the pro-Russian project aims to 
involve Ukraine in the re-integration of the post-So-
viet region. 
It is worth stressing that there is no clear border 
between Russia and Ukraine, the two largest Slav-
ic countries, because of the fact that their territories 
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lands remain tightly connected in economic, com-
municative and ethnocultural terms. In over two 
decades, significant parts of it have not even been 
demarked. The historic region of Slobozhanschyna, 
encompassing parts of today’s Ukraine (the Kharkiv 
regions, the parts of Sumy, the Donetsk, and 
Lugansk regions) and of Russia (parts of Belgorod, 
the Kursk, and Voronezh regions) is a representa-
tive model of the transience of the cross-border ar-
eas. The characteristics of the classic ethnocultural 
frontier areas can be seen in the results of the re-
search on the regional identity conducted by Krylov 
and Gritsenko (2014). The ethnocultural identity of 
the population in the areas close to the state bor-
der has mixed features. Moving away from the bor-
der and deeper into the territory of Russia and/or 
Ukraine (Fig. 2) is accompanied by decreasing du-
ality of the consciousness and, at the same time, the 
hardening of the national self-awareness. 
Since 2014, all changes have pointed to an un-
equivocal course to the Westernisation of a pre-
dominantly Orthodox country. Large parts of its 
population remain tightly connected to Russia and 
Belarus in terms of a way of life and family rela-
tionships. In this context, the new geocultural ap-
proach of Russia, based on the ethnocentric concept 
of the Russian World, wins supporters among the 
Ukrainian population thanks to reference to  Sovi-
et and post-Soviet elements of historical memory. 
It breaks away from traditional and more pluralist 
concepts of the Slavic brotherly and the Orthodox 
unity, narrowing the field of sympathy and partici-
pation in the Russian-centred project for integration 
by the people with strong Ukrainian self-awareness. 
In the traditionally ‘proletarian’ Donbass, the influ-
ence and concept of a Russian World leads to re-for-
matting of the identity of millions ‘Russian-speaking 
non-Russians’ and ‘non-Ukrainians’ (Nemenskiy, 
2014) to an identity with more pronounced re-
gional elements and a preference for Russian cul-
tural values and models of social relations. On the 
other hand, the geopolitics of soft power wins the 
pro-Western sympathy of Ukrainians with a supra-
Fig. 2. The Russian-Ukrainian ethnocultural gradient (according to Krylov and Gritsenko)
Source: Krylov, M. and Grisenko, A. 2014
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national project emphasizing on liberalization of the 
economy, security and development of civil society. 
6. The model of the Ukrainian political 
nation. A missed opportunity or 
a still possible option? 
The key terms in this model are ‘people of Ukraine’ 
and ‘Ukrainian nation’. The most accurate descrip-
tion would be the one of a constructivist model of 
creating a Ukrainian political nation through the 
consolidation of the people living in a common 
state, sharing one territory but possessing a par-
ticular historical experience, mentality, language, 
as well as civilizational and geopolitical orientation. 
The essence of a French model of political nation is 
the consolidation of equal citizens of various social 
groups united by a common language and equal po-
litical rights. This civil model of the nation failed in 
Ukraine for several reasons. 
First, the Ukrainian experience in applying West-
ern European models of nation happened at a later 
historical stage – between the 20th and 21st century.
Second, the Ukrainian regions are continuators 
of opposite political and ethnocultural traditions, 
thus they have a different degree of maturity and 
internal consolidation.
Third, there are the attempts to impose the strict-
ly-Ukrainian model of identity on all other regions, 
including the part of the Russian-speaking popula-
tion which possesses an established and stable eth-
nic, linguistic, and symbolic image of the world, as 
well as ethnocultural self-identification.
Fourth, there is ignorance on behalf of the sup-
porters of both the Galician and the pro-Russian 
identity of these different traditions and histori-
cal sensivity, the lack of self-criticism of their own 
myths, and of dialogic approach which would allow 
opening the arguments of the opposing side. 
Regardless of all problems of the ‘belated cre-
ation of the Ukrainian nation’ (Riabczuk, 2000), it 
was only the all-Ukrainian approach which carried 
and still carries hopes for ensuring the geopolitical 
unity. The pan-Ukrainian approach could succeed 
only if it were placed on a wide politico-cultural ba-
sis instead of a mono-ethnic (pan-Ukrainian) one. 
This means the realisation of a model of Ukraine 
as a multinational country, which guarantees the 
rights, freedoms, and equality of all its citizens, re-
gardless of their linguistic, ethnic, religious, or re-
gional affiliation. The pan-Ukrainianists, however, 
fight for the implementation of political and ad-
ministrative tools to ensure the domination of 
the Ukrainian language. Whereas the pro-Russian 
Ukrainians provide politics of bilingualism, em-
phasizing the peculiarities in the language policy of 
separate regions. 
The success of the all-Ukrainian project de-
pends on the synthesis of ideas, values, symbols 
and traditions not only of the pan-Ukrainian/Gali-
cian/pro-European identity, but of the pro-Rus-
sian/post-Soviet/Little Russian option as well. This 
model offers a more balanced option for the inter-
nal structure and international policy of the state. 
It is desired by the Ukrainian patriots in the east 
and west of Dnieper, and its ultimate goal is to pre-
serve the territorial integrity of Ukraine as a result 
of a balanced all-Ukrainian strategy. This means, in 
the first place, a consolidated, supranational, dem-
ocratic, and pluralist society with a modern devel-
oped economy, with devotion of all citizens to the 
Ukrainian state, perceiving it as their homeland, and 
a strong commitment to establish it as homogenous 
geopolitical subject with a positive image interna-
tionally. This project still has potential even if we 
exclude the population of Crimea and the pro-Rus-
sian separatists of Donbass. Ukraine remains a 
multinational country with regional differences in 
regard to the language, ethnic self-awareness, and 
electoral behaviour. The pluralistic option for devel-
opment seems to be the most natural from the per-
spective of the long-term stabilization of Ukraine. It 
has to be taken into consideration that neither Rus-
sia and its policy for unity of the Russian World will 
eliminate the feeling of the Ukrainian identity, nor 
the nationalist oriented language policy of the Kiev 
government will succeed, given that 50.0% of the 
population speaks only or predominantly Russian.
Mykhailo Hrushevsky, considered one of the fa-
thers of the Ukrainian historiography, was of the 
opinion that pluralism should be a basic princi-
ple of the Ukrainian international policy (Shabliy, 
2003: 390). In theory, at least, this is a natural way 
for Ukraine, taking into account the diverse histor-
ical experience of the regions, the geographical po-
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sition of the country and the divided geopolitical 
consciousness of the population. The main obsta-
cles for successful multi-vector Ukrainian geopoli-
tics, aimed at numerous ‘strategic partners’, are not 
only the influences of external geopolitical centres 
such as Russia, the EU, the USA, Poland, China, 
or Turkey. They have their own interests in solving 
the Ukrainian issue in one way or another, and in 
many global affairs provide a hostile policy against 
their competitors. In such circumstances, the geo-
political situation of Ukraine is also formed by the 
internal political and economic instability, the series 
of crises, failures to reach ethnic, confessional, and 
linguistic consolidation in the period of indepen-
dence, and the inability of the central government 
to balance between the different interests of the re-
gional politico-economic clans. It was exactly the 
lack of internal unity which did not allow Ukraine 
to change its function of a passive recipient of ex-
ternal geopolitical and economic influences. 
In an environment of multi-vector geopolitics, 
the elaboration of a common platform of nation-
al memory and political priorities requires an ac-
tive and open dialogue. This is very difficult in cases 
where the parties to the dispute have to unite around 
a common version of extremely traumatic moments 
of the history. What is it in this common history 
that divides Ukrainians? The dispute over the ac-
tivity of the Cossack Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, 
who joined Left-bank Ukraine with Russia in 1654, 
is an emblematic example. He is treated as a posi-
tive person in the East but in the West, Ivan Maz-
epa, who led a pro-Western policy, is considered a 
national hero. While the vast majority of Ukraine’s 
population sees the Pereyaslav agreement as a his-
torical mistake, a large part of the population in 
Donbass, according to sociological studies conduct-
ed between 1995 and 2010, appreciate this historic 
agreement (Mikhalchenko, 2015:11). Furthermore, 
the rehabilitation of the Ukrainian collaborators 
of the Second World War, the attempts to present 
the military units which fought against the Sovi-
et Union (and in certain phases – against Poles) as 
national heroes, are sources of a deep and long-last-
ing conflict of the collective memory. The chauvin-
istic views of some of the leaders of the Ukrainian 
nationalists from the mid 20th century, like Stepan 
Bandera, with whom the far-right nationalists, close 
to the current government, identify themselves, are 
unacceptable for Ukrainians with Russian/post-So-
viet self-consciousness. Even the memory of one of 
the most tragic events in the history of Ukraine – 
the Great Famine (Holodomor) in 1932–1933 can-
not bring together the views of all citizens. In 2006, 
the Ukrainian government adopted a law that rec-
ognized the Great Famine as genocide committed 
against the Ukrainian people, planned by the cen-
tral Soviet government. The opponents reject such 
an interpretation, arguing that not only Ukrainians 
were victims of the Great Famine, but also other 
ethnic groups in the Soviet Union, including people 
of other republics (Russia and Kazakhstan).
As Nemenskiy (2014) concludes, during the 
period of independence, the preservation of the 
Ukrainian state could have been possible only by 
meeting two conditions: the internal  condition – 
a political power, regardless of which part of the 
country it is elected by, would be positioned not as 
a representative of its ‘half ’, but as a mediator of the 
expectations of the whole population; the external 
condition – requires the maintaining of a geopolit-
ical uncertainty where the country can take a tem-
porary position between the main centres of power. 
The simultaneous participation in two integration 
projects proved to be impossible, however, the at-
tempts to preserve an interim position were also 
unsuccessful. 
7. Conclusion 
The events of 2014 and 2015 were a result of un-
solved political and economic questions accumulat-
ed during the period of post-Soviet transformation. 
Among them are isssues of both internal and ex-
ternal nature, such as follows: the complicated geo-
political position of Ukraine, the lack of a strategic 
vector of supranational integration, the divided his-
torical consciousness of the population, and influ-
ences of external powers (especially Russia). The 
competition between different models of identity 
was not probably the main reason for the Ukrain-
ian crisis which started with the students’ protest 
against a political decision of the central govern-
ment in November 2013. In the course of time, the 
ethnic and regional confrontation became a domi-
nant factor of the Ukrainian issue. 
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Four years after the pro-Western revolution in 
Kiev, two clear vectors of transformation of the sub-
national identities in the post-Soviet Ukraine can 
be outlined. 
First, there is a tendency to strengthen the role 
of the Ukrainian language in the information space 
of Ukraine and break the traditional ties with Rus-
sia in a radical way. There is an increased consoli-
dation around the idea of a strong and independent 
Ukrainian state and the principles of a Western type 
of political democracy. The fight and revolution 
against the pro-Russian government and the Presi-
dent, the cult of the ‘blue squadron’, the victory of 
the Revolution of dignity and the fight against the 
‘pro-Russian separatists’ from the east proved to be 
the new symbols of this group. There exists an ideo-
logical convergence between part of the represen-
tatives of the Little Russian and Galician branch of 
the Ukrainian identity (e.g., in cities with a tradi-
tional presence of the Russian language and culture 
like Odessa, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, or Zapor-
izhia).
The second trend comprises the widening of 
the gap in mentality and shared civilizational val-
ues between the population of the central and west-
ern regions of Ukraine and millions of Russians 
and Russian-speaking Ukrainians living in separate 
parts of the East. This is the so-called New Russian 
identity and its ‘Russian spring’ which led to loss of 
control over 7.3% of the territory of the Ukrainian 
Republic and 13.4% of its population in the first half 
of 2014. Counteracting the extreme radical groups, 
the armed fight against the Ukrainian army, the 
ideas of “an united and indivisible Russian World”, 
promotion of the so-called Donetsk and Lugansk 
People’s Republics, the postulates for joining Rus-
sia, and the requests for federalization of Ukraine, 
have all become the symbols of unification of this 
group. As in the case of both moderate and radi-
cal Ukrainian patriots/nationalists, the moral spir-
it of Novorossiya is also based on its own pantheon 
of heroes and martyrs like the victims of the an-
ti-Maidan movement who died in the fire in Odes-
sa on May 2, 2014. 
The most complicated task for the internal geo-
politics of Ukraine is searching for instruments for 
re-integration of two self-proclaimed “people’s re-
publics”. Loss of control over some strategic terri-
tories required using of military means in order to 
defend the sovereignty and territorial unity of the 
state. 
The drastic changes in conditions of internal 
geopolitics influence the geopolitical position of 
Ukraine on an international scale. In the course of 
a quarter of a century of independence, the chief 
factors of internal division and opposition and were 
not so strong and did not jeopardize the unitary 
nature and unity of the Ukrainian state. This pe-
riod of Ukraine’s development, however, is already 
part of history. From the perspective of its geopo-
litical positioning, Ukraine has entered a phase of 
distancing itself from the period of uncertainty and 
attempts for an asymmetrical integration. The cen-
tral government follows a clearly defined direction 
of its global geopolitics and foreign policy. They are 
more pro-Western and less pro-Russian.
The political mobilization of both All-Ukrainian 
identity and its regional (subnational) components, 
especially those distancing themselves from it, re-
quired changes in the current internal geopolitics. 
Like other European countries with a complex eth-
nic and regional structure, Ukraine came across the 
universal problem of balancing between the right 
of people to self-determination (it concerns titular 
nations and minority groups as well), but in a sit-
uation of disintegration of its territorial unity. The 
specifics of the Ukrainian issue is that separatist 
groups on the East are supported by their power-
ful neighbour. That is the reason why Ukraine is in 
a difficult geostrategic situation. Regardless of the 
means used by the central authorities (military, le-
gal, diplomatic ones, etc.) as the example of crises in 
former Yugoslavia shows, without a decisive share 
of external factors, the problem of territorial unity 
will be impossible to solve.
Notes
(1) A brief episode of the history of autonomism 
on the territory of Ukraine is the Donetsk-Krivoy 
Rog Soviet Republic which existed for a few weeks 
in 1918. The Republic was formed on the basis of 
economic specialization including rich coal and ore 
reserves.
(2) Till 2014 – UNA-UNSO – Ukrainian Nation-
al Assembly – Ukrainian National Self-Defense.
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